Metaphysics (The New Hackett Aristotle) by Aristotle

Author:Aristotle [Aristotle]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781624665134
Publisher: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
Published: 2016-03-01T05:00:00+00:00

BOOK BETA (III)

Note 250

First go over topics about which we should first raise puzzles: See Α 10 993a27n.

Raise puzzles (aporêsai): “There is a puzzle about whether a thing holds or not, because there are strong arguments on both sides” (Top. I 11 104b13–14; also NE IX 8 1168b10–12)—even if, as the next sentence makes clear, these arguments have been overlooked by other people.

Note 251

Thought (dianoia): Dianoia is often contrasted with the body (Pol. II 9 1270b40, VII 16 1335b16), making “mind” seem a natural translation of it. But unlike the mind, which includes perception, imagination, belief, knowledge, desire, virtues of character, and other such things, dianoia is contrasted with each of these. It is not perception, because all animals have that, whereas “the majority of animals do not have dianoia” (DA I 5 410b24). It is not imagination, because, as we might put it, dianoia is propositional, or operates on things that can be true or false, asserted or denied (Pol. II 11 1273a22), whereas imagination is a representational state that is more like perception, more “imagistic.” Thus “what assertion and denial are in the case of thought, that, in the case of desire, is precisely what pursuit and avoidance are” (NE VI 2 1139a21–22). Unlike belief and knowledge, however, “thought is in fact not yet assertion” (VI 9 1142b12–13), making it natural to think of it, or some of it anyway, as the process of reasoning that can culminate in a belief or an asserted proposition (Pol. IV 15 1299a30 and V 8 1307b35 are nice examples). And this is further evidenced by the fact that the virtues of thought, which are theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom (NE I 13 1103a4–6), are (respectively) those of the scientific sub-part and the rationally calculative sub-part, of the part of the soul that has reason (VI 1 1139a5–12). At the same time, the fact that scientific knowledge includes both demonstrative reasoning and a grasp on scientific starting-points by the understanding implies that not all thinking need be in any sense inferential, since understanding is non-inferential—a grasping of something rather than something process-like (Pol. VII 13 1325b20 is a good example). Dianoia is not desire, because, while desire can cause animal movement without thought, as it does in the case of non-rational animals, “thought by itself… moves nothing” (NE VI 2 1139a35–36). As a result, it is not character (Pol. VIII 2 1337a38–39), since the latter, as involving desire, is cultivated by habituation, {315} whereas dianoia is cultivated by teaching (NE II 1 1103a14–18)—hence the common contrast between thought and character (Pol. III 11 1281b7).

Note 252

Does not even know whether he has found what he was inquiring into: Reading οὐδ’ εἴ ποτε with Ross for OCT οὐδὲ πότερον (“nor does he know whether”). See Plato, Men. 80d5–81d5 (quoted Α 9 993a1n).

Note 253

P1: See Β 2 996a18–b26. Restated as P1 at Κ 1 1059a20–23. Discussed at Γ 1, 2.

The topic we went through the puzzles about (diêporêsamen) in our prefatory remarks: Though the reference could be to Α 2 982b7–10, this is unlikely for the following reason.

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